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Private Giving Crowding Government Funding in Public Higher Education
G. Thomas Sav
Department of Economics, Wright State University, Dayton, Ohio 45435
Abstract: Problem statement: Private giving and government funding are critical revenue sources for
public colleges and universities. If increased private giving reduces government funding, then that type
and extent of crowding out carries important managerial and public policy implications. Approach: The
study used a government funding reaction function and an instrumental variable approach to
empirically estimate the potential for crowding out. Results: The study examined the extent to which
private giving reduces or crowds out state government funding of public colleges and universities.
Government free riding was at question and investigated to determine how active it is in terms of
private donations partially or wholly displacing state government funding. The findings suggested that
the rate of crowding out was 43% on the dollar. That compares to the 45% political substitution of the
1960’s but is much diminished from the 1980’s dollar for dollar crowding out. Those are aggregate
comparisons for all public institutions. A disaggregated approach in this study additionally revealed
that doctoral universities were victims of the same 43% crowd out but that at two other levels, master
degree granting and associate degree granting colleges, there was the opposite effect of crowding in.
Those colleges received state funding augmentations of 32-92% on their dollar of privately provided
donations. Conclusion/Recommendations: The study’s finding of the existence of both crowding out
and crowding in can carry important policy implications for college and university funding. Future
managerial and public policy decision making should take that into account. However, political
sustainability and economy wide and localized effects over time of crowding out and in could prove
fruitful avenues of inquiry for future research.
Key words: Education finance, private giving, crowding out
financial changes taking place in higher education.
State universities and colleges have been devoting
greater internal resources to fundraising in pursuit of
private donations. New competition with the traditional
flagship universities has arisen as even two-year
postsecondary institutions are now full force in the
private fund raising business. Local governments have
been approached and responded to funding efforts. At
the same time, colleges and universities have
experienced reductions in state government funding.
In this context, questions arise as to the current
relationship between public higher education private
fund raising and state government support. Is complete
crowding out sustainable? Even partial crowd out with
enhanced private giving will exacerbate declines in
state provided revenues. If governments do react
differently over time, then it is important to explore
those changes and determine whether or not funding
displacement continues to prevail.
This study attempts to do so by moving forward
toward the present and using the most recently
deployed financial data for public colleges and
universities.
Changes
in
financial
reporting

INTRODUCTION
This study examines the extent to which private
giving reduces or crowds out state government funding
of public colleges and universities. It is based on the
notion that private support of public higher education
can give rise to a reaction whereby state politicians and
bureaucrats reallocate available tax dollars away from
education toward self promoting pursuits. For public
higher education in the United States, this form of
government free riding has been empirically examined
twice. Peltzman (1973) found that during the mid
1960’s it existed in the form of partial crowding out on
the order of a 45% reduction in state funding per dollar
of university funds raised through private donations. In
the work of Becker and Lindsay (1994) it increased in
the mid 1980’s to complete or dollar-for-dollar
crowding out.
Indeed, it is puzzling that two more decades have
passed with the absence of this attention to public
higher education, especially given the movement from
partial to complete crowd out. Needless to say, the lay
literature abounds with articles reporting the continuing
293
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An alternative focus has rested upon the opposite
notion that private giving crowds out government
support. There are two major research pieces that take
this line of inquiry. Both centers on higher education
(other studies have scrutinized higher education under
the crowding out proposition, but in the much narrower
context of internal resource allocations and the
fungibility of institutional dollars. Ehrenberg et al.
(1993) found that federal funding of graduate education
partially crowded out internal funding in doctoral
granting universities. Connolly (1997) found that
external government research funding caused an
increase in internal research support. That crowding in
is also a finding of Payne (2001) but it is increased
private rather than government research giving that
increases externally provided federal research support
at research universities). First is Peltzman (1973)
seminal work on in-kind subsidies. He posits that the
demand for public higher education is tied to the
political process and that increased private expenditures
generate a “political substitution” effect whereby
legislators react by reducing government funding.
Employing aggregate state level data for 1967, his
estimated per dollar “coefficient of political
substitution” is -0.45.
Second and within the same framework, Becker
and Lindsay (1994) contend that self-interested
governments free ride on private giving. Subject to
legal or obligated funding constraints, government
agents pursue their own utility, including vote
maximization, at the expense of attending to allocative
efficiencies. Increased private provision of a public
good tends to weaken constraints, inducing a
government reallocation reaction and subsequent
expenditure reduction. Using institutional level data for
public colleges and universities, their mid 1980’s
crowding out parameter of -1.07 is a combined state
and local government funding reduction per dollar of
institutional funding received from private donors. Not
significantly different from unity, they conclude that
private giving results in dollar-for-dollar crowd out.
The two studies suggest a movement from partial
to complete crowding out that raise questions as to the
current relationship between private charity and fund
raising efforts on the part of institutions of higher
education. The remainder of this study turns to that
relationship at it currently pertains to public colleges
and universities (Both Peltzman (1973) and Becker and
Lindsay (1994) do provide separate group estimates for
public and private schools but find the absence of any
significant relationship between government support
and private donations among the latter. It is admitted
that the lack of any correlation is likely due to the very
small state funding presence in the private sector).

requirements incorporated into the data roll over to
improvements in the empirical work at hand. Alongside
the much needed updates, a major contribution is
offered in providing disaggregated estimates of
crowding out. In addition to aggregate estimates as
provided in the two previous studies, institutions are
disaggregated according to Carnegie classifications and
potential crowding out is examined across four levels:
Doctoral, master, bachelor and two year degree
granting colleges and universities. The fiscal year 2006
results for 1200 institutions indicates a return to partial
crowding out for the aggregate of those institutions and
among doctoral universities as a separate group. In
contrast, there appears matching funding behavior on
the part of state governments that actually produces
crowding in among master and associate degree
granting public colleges and universities.
Background: Development of the general relationship
between private and government funding of public
goods has hinged on the assumption that individuals
receive utility from private good consumption and the
total of support to a public good (Bergstrom et al.,
1986). As extensions, the latter has been separated into
present and past private donor behavior (Andreoni,
1990). For a pure public good, government and private
sources are perfect substitutes, one completely
crowding out the other. If donors are motivated purely
by the act of giving or a warm glow, then individual
contributions transform to a private good (RoseAckerman, 1982) and zero crowding out occurs. Bases
of partial crowd out are necessarily more diverse and,
e.g., have theoretically incorporated donor-recipient
utility interdependence (Abrams and Schmitz, 1978).
One thread of empirical studies concentrates on
investigating the extent to which increased government
expenditures displace private giving. The evidence is
mixed. Often cited are the Abrams and Schmitz (1978)
crowding out parameter of -0.28 in which a dollar of
government expenditures on an aggregate of welfare
programs reduces private charity by 28%. Kingma
(1989), arguing that reliable estimates require use of
specific rather than aggregate public goods, finds half
(-0.135) that level of crowd out in public radio.
Manzoor and Straub (2005) re-examination of public
radio find that it could be five times that magnitude. In
other studies, there are reports of complete (Roberts,
1984) crowding out. Recently, interest in the possibility
of the reverse effect of crowding in has arisen and, at
research universities, Payne (2001) finds a 65%
increase in private research donations per dollar of
increased federal research support.
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where, past or lagged private donor funding is proxied
by accumulated wealth in the form of institutional
endowment, ENDOW.
Upon estimation, whether or not and to what extent
there exists a displacement of private for state
funding is determined by the crowding out parameter,
β. In particular, crowding out can be absent (β = 0),
partial (-1<β<0), or complete, if not super, (β≤-1). Of
course, there are special state government programs
whereby college and university privately raised dollars
are partially or even more than dollar for dollar
matched by state funds. In that event, there could be the
overall effect of crowding in (β>0).
If it is possible for the private provision of public
higher education to cause state governments to react
with funding changes, then it also seems plausible that
the same state governments would react to other
funding sources, viz., that provided by other
governments. Becker and Lindsay (1994) empirically
investigated this notion through the effect of federal
contributions in the reaction function. Presently, we
will likewise extend our inquiry in this direction, but
amend the methodology to include local, in addition to
state government funding. Thus, it is contended that,
when feasible, state governments would also free ride
on local and federal government contributions.
Our two previous empirical estimates examined
crowding out for the aggregate of all public colleges
and universities. That ignores the fact that there are
homogeneous institutional groups chartered for specific
public goods needs that might tend to attract like
political and donor support. The so-called flagship
research universities differ from the two year (junior or
community college) degree granting institutions. All are
publicly supported and all are engaged in the private
fund raising game, but they have different missions and
during their fund raising drives they peddle different
goods. In order to capture such differences, our
empirical work will segment the industry by the
Carnegie Classification Code and investigate crowding
out in the aggregate and disaggregated according to
four institutional levels: doctoral, master, bachelor and
associate degree granting institutions.

MATERIALS AND METHODS
Our specific interest lies with a government
reaction function whereby state funding of a public
college or university is determined and affected by
specific
outputs,
performance
measures
and
characteristics, but also the level of private donor
funding. Following the works of Peltzman (1973) and
Becker and Lindsay (1994), the general reaction
function can be expressed as follows:
STATEFUND = α 0 + ∑ α i X i + βPGIVING + ε

(1)

i

where, STATEFUND is the annual dollar amount that
the institution receives from the state government and
depends upon a set of institutional outputs and
attributes, X and the annual funding received through
private giving, PGIVING.
In part, state funding is legislated and tied to
specific institutional outputs and, in part, it flows from
discretionary pots of monies available for allocation
and subject to political influence. In all cases, state
appropriations are a function of college and university
teaching output as usually measured by student
enrollments or credit hour production. But state funding
is also influenced by some loose performance measures
that are expected outputs of public colleges and
universities, including research and public service
output. There are also institutional characteristics, e.g.,
auxiliary facilities like sports arenas and student
dormitories, which potentially appeal to or manipulate
the state political machinery.
Private giving is largely the result of fund raising
efforts, both present and past, of individual colleges and
universities. Those efforts make potentially new and
past private donors aware of the educational outputs,
accomplishments and needs of the institution and offer
to them that warm glow that they would enjoy from
being contributors. The process is intended to create a
permanent donor base and to continuously expand upon
it. Thus it is likely that both current private giving and,
therefore, state funding are influenced by past giving
(Andreoni and Payne, 2003; Becker and Lindsay,
1994). Hence, for empirical estimation of the reaction
equation, ordinary least squares are not appropriate. As
with Peltzman (1973) and Becker and Lindsay (1994)
we employ instrumental variables and in the reaction
function use predicted private giving as recovered from:
PGIVING = δ0 + ∑ δi Xi + γ ENDOW + ε

Data: Data for individual colleges and universities are
drawn from the US Department of Education; National
Center
for
Education
Statistics,
Integrated
Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) (in
1988, IPEDS replaced the former National Center for
Education Statistics data used by Becker and Lindsay
(1994). IPEDS requires separate reporting by all
colleges and universities where as previously data were
combined for parent and child institutions, i.e., main
campus data was combined with all branch campuses.
If the latter receive differential private or state funding,

(2)

i
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then the Becker and Lindsay (1994) estimates would be
biased. Using IPEDS that problem is currently avoided.
Also, Becker and Lindsay (1994) arbitrarily eliminated
colleges receiving less than $50,000 in private support.
Here, we include such institutions). There is
considerable annual lag in the assembly and release of
final data sets. The most recently available is for the
fiscal year 2006 and is used here. The finance,
institutional characteristics and enrollment surveys
from IPEDS are combined to produce a useable data set
of 1, 210 public universities and colleges, Here that is
subset by doctoral granting universities (147) and
master (247), bachelor (54) and two year associate
degree granting colleges (762) (The Carnegie
Classification Codes have undergone changes over time
but here doctoral combines the two levels of Carnegie
Doctoral/Research Universities, master combines both
the Carnegie Master’s Colleges and Universities I and
II levels, bachelor combines both Baccalaureate
Colleges-Liberal Arts and-General levels and associate
is a combination of Baccalaureate/Associate’s Colleges
and Associate’s Colleges. The eight classifications are
collapsed into four levels based on the fact that, for the
purposes at hand, the very slight differences in missions
cannot be reasonably quantified).
IPEDS is used to derive institutional revenues from
sources pertaining to State Funding (STATEFUND),
Private Giving (PGIVING), Local funding (LOCAL)
and Federal funding (FED). In attempting to link state
funding to teaching output we recognize that not all
teaching is treated equally in state funding formulas or
given equal treatment in discretionary funding. Also,
different teaching has different visibility that can shape
private giving. IPEDS allows us to include teaching
variability according to three outputs, Undergraduate
(UGRAD), Professional (PROF) and Graduate (GRAD)
teaching. Each is measured as full time equivalent
enrollments. Medical school enrollments are not
available, but the schools are highly visible, produce
external community benefits and one would think they
are usually productive in creating special government
and private support. Thus, we include a dummy variable

for the presence of a Medical school (MED). With
reluctance but believed to be out of necessity, to control
for possible remnants of any racial discrimination in
educational funding on either funding side, the
Percentage of student enrollment that is Black
(PBLACK) is incorporated as a funding determinant.
Research and service, the other large portions of
college and university production and presumably
affecting government support and valued by private
donors, are more controversial in measuring. Like
others (Cohen et al., 1989) it will be necessary to
assume that the available financial data on institutional
expenditures correlate with production. From IPEDS,
the proxies are, therefore, annual Research (RES) and
public Service (SER) expenditures.
The campus auxiliary facilities serve a variety of
constituents whether they are sports arenas,
entertainment
complexes,
food
services,
or
dormitories. They are either directly or indirectly
subsidized through state funding mechanisms and a
plethora of fund raising undertakings are attached to
them. As with research and service, the best interinstitutional measure available is the annual
expenditures on Auxiliary enterprises (AUX).
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Table 1 contains a summary of the variables along
with their means and standard deviations for all 1,210
institutions combined and separately for each of the
four levels. As expected, doctoral universities, even
though comprising less than 4% of the institutions,
command 85% of private giving. Lower level
institutions on average gather smaller private donations
in the both the present and during the past and also
receive less state support. But the associate degree
granting colleges produce more undergraduate
education on average than either the master or bachelor
level institutions. At the undergraduate level, the
associates actually serve 60% of the student population.

Table 1: Variable means and standard deviations by institutional level
Variable
STATEFUND
PGIVING
UGRAD
PROF
GRAD
PBLACK
MED
RES
SER
AUX
LOCAL
FED
ENDOW
N

Description
State government funding, $
Private giving, $
Undergraduate FTE
Professional FTE
Graduate FTE
Percent black enrollment
Medical school (if so = 1)
Research expenditures, $
Public service expenditures, $
Auxiliary enterprises, $
Local government funding, $
Federal government funding, $
Institution endowment, $
Observations

All
40.0 (68.5)
3.1 (12.8)
11273 (9996)
87 (381)
1205 (2500)
13.7 (18.0)
14.4 (5.9)
6.1 (2.2)
12.6 (2.9)
10.0 (2.2)
19.6 (5.9)
38.6 (2.1)
1210

Doctoral
171.9 (122.5)
21.5 (31.0)
19648 (9024)
668 (883.0)
6167 (3442)
10.7 (15.8)
0.4
113.0 (134.0)
39.2 (50.4)
66.2 (58.1)
31.2 (46.6)
114.5 (136.0)
275.6 (543.2)
147

Note: For presentation, all dollars are presented in millions; FTE: Full Time Equivalent
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Master
44.8 (30.2)
1.3 (1.8)
9345 (5999)
2177 (1812)
15.8 (23.5)
2.9 (5.0)
3.8 (5.3)
13.3 (11.1)
1.9 (4.4)
10.8 (10.3)
16.5 (24.0)
247

Bachelor
15.3 (10.4)
0.7 (1.9)
3933 (2406)
16.1 (25.7)
0.7 (1.2)
1.6 (2.0)
6.0 (4.9)
0.8 (1.5)
5.0 (5.0)
9.5 (39.0)
54

Associate
14.8 (14.60)
0.3 (1.1)
10802 (10596)
13.4 (15.5)
0.02 (8.2)
0.8 (1.7)
2.5 (3.1)
9.3 (15.3)
5.2 (5.7)
2.3 (6.3)
762
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Table 2: Private giving estimates by institutional level
Variable
INTERCEPT
UGRAD
PROF
GRAD
PBLACK
MED
RES
SER
AUX
LOCAL
FED
ENDOW
F
Adj R2
N

All
81979 (302990)
100.80* (22.72)
1169.72 (835.23)
-324.64* (113.61)
-737940 (968867)
-4143084* (102363)
0.196* (0.013)
0.243* (0.013)
0.073* (0.010)
-0.109* (0.013)
-0.022** (0.012)
0.011* (0.001)
393.99*
0.781
1210

Doctoral
365592 (3861106)
-252.41** (253.73)
4896.55 (2646.82)
607.09 (673.15)
-2264728 (9103219)
-7076060** (3705092)
0.301* (0.047)
0.022 (0.036)
0.083* (0.033)
-0.313* (0.062)
-0.076** (0.039)
0.009* (0.004)
35.05*
0.72
147

Master
-135034 (228514)
76.59* (27.32)
-68.88 (74.09)
-128083 (484479)
0.0590* (0.0240)
0.0060 (0.0220)
0.035* (0.0100)
-0.050* (0.0240)
-0.0150 (0.0150)
0.030* (0.0040)
12.81*0
0.3020
247

Bachelor
13319415 (2148)
89.32* (36.99)
647128** (339045)
0.056 (0.082)
0.06 (0.055)
-0.004 (0.018)
-0.146* (0.052)
-0.063* (0.021)
0.046* (0.002)
86.01*
0.928
54

Associate
87099 (63948.000)
20.52* (5.260)
258903 (241960)
0.0450 (0.4470)
0.0110 (0.0230)
-0.0030 (0.0130)
-0.006** (0.003)
-0.013** (0.008)
0.030* (0.006)
7.66*
0.650
762

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *: Significance at the 5% level or better; **: Significance at the 10% level or better
Table 3: State funding estimates by institutional level
Variable
INTERCEPT
UGRAD
PROF
GRAD
PBLACK
MED
RES
SER
AUX
LOCAL
FED
PGIVING
F
Adj R2
N

All
3002338* (1529192)
1737.68* (125.35)
24001.79* (4394.08)
6458.68* (602.58)
37160 (49273)
-5072463 (5862669)
1.474* (0.121)
0.952 (0.066)
0.795* (0.069)
-0.627* (0.092)
-0.246* (0.059)
-0.434* (0.056)
510.20*
0.822
1210

Doctoral
7002155 (19093266)
1445.78 (137970)
31679.81** (17222.81)
6029.51** (3657.29)
-63657 (451541)
-5904956 (23672360)
1.708* (0.585)
0.623 (0.184)
0.818* (0.237)
-0.893 (0.678)
-0.430* (0.202)
-0.427* (0.187)
25.82*
0.661
147

Master
2168199 (2474255)
2989.25* (340.68)
2025.97* (827.51)
29975 (53081)
0.284 (0.288)
-0.584* (0.246)
0.136 (0.033)
-0.450** (0.276)
0.587** (0.163)
0.318* (0.173)
65.25*
0.71
247

Bachelor
1533376 (1881521)
2264.55* (450.9)
177210* (42056)
-0.038 (1.013)
0.519 (0.678)
0.761* (0.218)
0.254 (0.648)
-0.654* (0.253)
-0.387 (0.524)
12.59*
0.643
54

Associate
327722.000 (787919)
1019.06* (90.22)
-3990 (28385)
10.903* (5.200)
0.054 (0.275)
0.267** (0.160)
-0.302* (0.042)
0.533* (0.102)
0.921* (0.2430)
113.38*
0.591
762

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *: Significance at the 5% level or better; **: Significance at the 10% level or better

dollar of private fund raising. The two prior empirical
studies are based on that kind of aggregation and, thus,
the current 43% compares to Peltzman’s 45% political
substitution during the 1960’s, down considerably from
Becker and Lindsay’s complete 1980’s dollar-for-dollar
crowding out.
Yet unlike both those studies, the disaggregation
approach undertaken here appears to be fruitful in
uncovering quite a different crowding picture across
different institutional levels. The results reveal an
unbalanced government reaction. Crowding out as it
pertains to the estimated PGIVING coefficient only
exists within two of the four institutional levels,
doctoral universities and bachelor degree granting
colleges. The state-private 43% displacement at
doctoral universities far exceeds the 4% for bachelor
degree colleges, but the latter is statistically
insignificant. The doctoral effects tend to have an
overwhelming power in influencing the aggregate (All)
estimates. That derives from the observed reactions in
the other two levels where state government support
responds positively to private charity. In both master
level and associate level colleges, state governments

Table 2 and 3 present the regression results for the
first and second stages respectively (in each case,
Hausman’ specification test was employed to determine
if the instrumental variables method was preferred to
the more efficient ordinary least squares. In all cases
except the bachelor level group, the ordinary least
squares method was found to be an inconsistent
estimator at the 1% and better level of significance. The
ordinary least squares estimates for the bachelor level
institutions, however, did not seem to warrant panic nor
a replacement of the instrumental variables estimates,
especially given the small presence of bachelor degree
granting colleges group in the public sector and our
analysis. The gain in R2 was less than 1% and the
private giving coefficient only changed from a negative
0.387-0.351). Turning to the main thrust of the inquiry,
the empirical estimates provided in Table 3 support the
proposition that among publicly controlled state
colleges and universities, state government funding
responds to private provision. When government
reaction to private giving is based on the aggregation of
All (All) institutions, there is partial crowding out to the
extent of a 43% reduction in government funding per
297
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elect government decision makers. Hence, the funding
reactions should and do parallel one another.

match successful private fund raising efforts:
approximately 32 and 92% on the dollar, respectively.
This crowding in is apparently buried in the aggregate
“All” estimates provided here and therefore quite likely,
in the two previous studies. That there does exist
political complementarity is encouraging, especially in
defense of successful college and university fund
raising.
From the state government reaction estimates, there
emerges evidence of free riding on other government
funding. In the aggregate and across all institutional
levels, Federal dollars (FED) substitutes for state
dollars in the funding behavior of state decision makers.
It varies from 25% displacement in the aggregate of all
institutions to 65% for the small group of bachelor
degree granting colleges. And while the funding stakes
are generally smaller at the Local (LOCAL)
government level, there is significant per dollar crowd
out evident in the aggregate, but when disaggregated it
appears only at the master and associate level
institutions. Still, those two combined make up more
than 80% of publicly controlled higher education
institutions. Of the remaining determinants of state
funding decisions, the majority of results are as
expected. In practice, state funding related to teaching
output is almost universally formula driven and that is
borne out here with respect to UGRAD, PROF and
GRAD. It is comforting that we can reject any
significant presence of racial discrimination (PBLACK)
in the state mechanism. In fact, there are rewards for
student diversity and significantly so at bachelor level
institutions. Against expectation, the MED coefficient
is negative but without statistically significant effects.
It’s suspected that they are institutions in themselves
and their autonomy is not captured in the financial data
via IPEDS. With only two exceptions, research and
service output along with auxiliary enterprises carry
positive funding impacts, but as would be further
expected with varying degrees across college and
university levels.
Returning to the instrumental variable estimates of
Table 2, the results on private giving are equally
interesting even though the overall explanatory abilities
are weaker, especially so in the master level group of
colleges. But it is true here that college and university
private fund raising is more lucrative the larger the past
donor base (ENDOW). However, according to our
estimates, private donors do react negatively to Local
(LOCAL) and Federal (FED) government support. Aside
from the weaker results in the master level colleges, that
crowding out is everywhere present. All in all, the results
with respect to individual determinants are in line with
that given above for state funding. Private donors also

CONCLUSION
Based on this research, government free riding
appears to be alive and well and implies that private
fund raising in public higher education partially crowds
out state government funding at the rate of 43% on the
dollar. That is based on an aggregate of some 1,200
colleges and universities in 2006. It is on the same
order as Peltzman’s 1960 political substitution of 45%
but considerably diminished in comparison to Becker
and Lindsay’s 1980 dollar-for-dollar crowding out.
The present finding of crowding out decline is by
itself significant for the revenue implications of
successful private fund raising on the part of public
colleges and universities. However, the current research
is believed to offer even wider contributions.
Unlike the two previous works, the current study
expands upon the methodology and examines the
crowding out proposition by disaggregating public
higher education institutions according to their
Carnegie Classification Code. The relationship between
state and private support is investigated separately for
doctoral, master, bachelor and associate degree granting
colleges and universities. That unbundling proved to be
empirically productive in revealing that state
government reaction to private giving is substantially
different among different institutional levels. Powerful
partial crowding out on the order of 43% is found to
persist among doctoral universities. But in contrast, the
opposite effect actually prevails in the master and
associate level colleges and universities. Their private
fund raising dollars are rewarded with additional state
funding on the order of 32% and 92%, respectively.
The two groups combined comprise 83% of the public
institutions and serve 77% of the undergraduate student
population. In that sense, the funding complementarity
disclosed herein weighs favorably for the future
financial well being of a large segment of public higher
education.
But there are some cautions in order. They rest first
on the additional finding and in support of previous
work that state governments react to other government
funding and tend to free ride on local and federal
support of their publicly controlled colleges and
universities. Second, there remains the question of
political sustainability over time of any free riding,
crowding out, or now crowding in. And third whether
or not any of these funding reactions are subject to
economy wide, regional, or localized economy effects,
have not been rigorously addressed here or elsewhere.
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certainly be desirable.
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